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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAUD D. COON and JOSEPH COON, 
husband and wife, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 7470 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELATING TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE TRAN-
SCRIPT OF RECORD AND ARGUMENT THEREON. 
The defendant and respondent, Utah Construction 
Company, has served and filed herein its motion· to 
strike appellant's transcript of official record because 
it was not settled or filed as provided by law. A copy 
of the motion is included in the brief as Appendix A. 
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The record sho'~'s that the findings of f,act and 
conclusions of law and judgment were signed and 
filed on June 8, 1949. On July 8, 1949, the plaintiff 
served and filed a motion for new trial. On September 
6, 1949, the court made and entered its order as follows: 
''Upon the motion of Grover A. Giles, counsel 
for the plaintiffs and good cause appearing there-
for, it is ordered that the plaintiffs' motion for 
new trial be, and the same is hereby denied.'' 
It is respondent's contention that since the motion 
, for new trial was denied upon the motion of Grover 
A. Giles, counsel for plaintiffs, that it was not neoes-
.s·ary for the defendant to serve notice of overruling 
of the motion for new trial in order to start the time 
running within which the· appellant must prepare, 
serve and file the bill of exceptions. 
On November 26, 1949, the appellant served, and 
on November 28, filed their notice of appeal. On De-
cember 17 an order was made and entered extending 
. the_ appellant's time from December 26, 1949, to J anu-
ary 26, 1950. On January 21, 1950, appellant, pro-
ceeding under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
served a designation of record on appeal and pro-
ceeded upon the theory that the rules of civil pro-
.cedure made unnecessary the a;>·erfecting of the appeal 
under the old statute which included the serving and 
filing and settling of a bill of exceptions. 
Respondent does not take issue with appellant's 
theory that since January 1, 1950, bills of excep~tion 
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3 
have been m:a.de unnecessary 1n the nevv appellate 
procedure. It is, ho,veYer, respondent's contention and 
position that the rules of procedure vvere not effective 
prior to January 1, 1950, and that since the time for 
appellant to ;prepare, serYe and file a bill of excep-
tions had expired on October 6, 1949, 'vhich vvas 
thirty days :after the motion for new trial was over-
ruled ~"pon r~otion of appellant's- attorney, that neither 
the notice of appeal thereafter served nor the rules 
of ciril procedure thereafter adopted could revive the 
bill of exceptions by calling it a designation of record 
on appeal or by :a.ny other n1eans. It was not the 
intention of the Supreme Court in adopt~ng the Utah 
rules of civil procedure to make it possible for an 
appellant, whose time to prepare, serve and file a· 
bill of exception& under the procedure theretofore 
existing had expired, and who had served and filed a 
notice of appeal prior to the_ effective date of the 
new rules, to file a designation of record on ap1peal 
under the new rules and thereby cure a fatal defect 
in the procedure required for the filing of a bill of 
exceptions under the former practice . 
. 
Rule 75(a) with respect to designation of contents of 
record on appeal provides : 
''Within ten days after the filing of the 
notice of appeal, the appellant shall serve upon 
the respondent and file with the District Court 
a designation of the portion of the record. 
proceedings, and evidence to be contained in the 
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4 
record of appeal unless the res:pondent has 
already served and filed a designation.'' 
Appellant's notice of appeal was served and filed 
on November 28, 1949, and the designation of· con-
tents of record was not served and filed ·within ten 
days of that date. 
It is our position simply stated that the time to 
serve and fi~e the bill of exceptions expired on October 
6, 1949, which was thirty days after the motion for 
new trial was overruled upon motion of appellant's 
own attorney. The thirty-day period was not started 
·anew under the Utah cases by the appellant's there-
after serving and filing the notice of appeal. 
Rule 1 provides that the rules govern all pro-
ceedings brought after they take effect and ;all pro-
ceedings in actions then pending except to the extent 
that in the opinion of the court the wpplication in a 
particular . action pending when the rules take ~ffect, 
would not be feasible or would work injustice, in 
which event the former procedure applies. If appel-
lant asserts that the new rules apply his designa-
tion of record is ineffective because it was not filed 
within ten days after the filing of notice of appeal. 
While there is no Utah precedent on the point, the 
language of rule 1 quoted ahove seems to definitely 
(Provide· that where the appellant was in no position 
to file a designation of the record within ten days 
from the date of ap.peal, that he should have con-
tinued the method of perfecting his appeal under the 
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5 
old statutes and should have had a bill of exceptions 
serYed, filed and settled within the time provided by law. 
In Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320; 145 Pac. 
1036, the court held that" the plaintiff's bill of excep-
tions should be stricken. The records sho'v that the 
judgment "'"as filed and entered January 28, 1914, 
and on May 25, 1914, plaintiff's counsel served notiee 
of the decision upon defendant's counsel. Defendant's 
counsel signified his intention to appeal and incorpo- -
rated into their bill of exceptions only so much of the· 
proceedings as they deemed_ material to their ap.peal. 
Plaintiff had obtained an extension of time to prepare 
and settle the bill to May 20, 1914. The bill of the 
plaintiff was settled on June 25. · Plaintiff contended 
that this was within time because he was entitled 
to notice of the decision from defendant's counsel and 
that since no notice was served upon him that the 
time within which to prepare and serve a proposed 
bill of exceptions had not commenced to run when 
his proposed bill was in fact served. Holding that the 
~plaintiff was in error in this contention, our court said: 
"To hold that the Legislature intended that 
both parties must serve and are entitled to notice 
of the en try of a decision in a p·articular case 
is to hold that it intended something unreason-
able, if not -absurd. The whole purpose of- the 
statute is to give the aggrieved party who may 
intend to appeal, sufficient time within which 
to prepare and serve his proposed bill of excep-
tions, in which either all or so much of the rpro-
ceedings of the trial court may be, set forth as 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
1nay be deemed necessary to such appeal. The 
notice provided for in the section is intended to 
set the time in motion within which the proposed 
bill of exceptions must be prepared and served. 
Now, is it reasonable to suppose that the party 
who prepares and serves the notice, which must 
contain a ·statement of the time that the deci-
sion was filed, is entitled to a further notice of 
what he must be conclusively presumed to know~ 
Is not the notice which he 1lrepares and serves 
upon his adversary also notice to him of what 
it contains~ Why should it be held to impart 
notice to the person up~on whom served but not 
upon him who is required to prepare and serve 
it~ As already intimated, to so hold would, in 
our judgment, lead to an absurdity. Under all 
of our holdings, therefore, the court was with-
out power to settle and allow plaintiff's ~proposed 
bill of exceptions and therefore we cannot con-
sider it for any purpose.'' 
If notice served by the p~laintiff on the defendant 
1n the above cited case is also notice to the plaintiff 
of the entry of judgment it would seem absurd and 
an unnecessary requirement to say that where plain-
tiff's own counsel has himself moved that this motion 
for new trial be overruled and if such is the ruling 
in open court and in the presence of plaintiff's coun-
sel that he must nevertheless he served with written 
notice of overruling of his motion for new trial in 
order to start running the time within which a bill 
of exceptions must .be served and filed, it would 
result in a holding by the court that notice must be 
given to the attorney "\\rho was the only one as shown 
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by the record "·ho \Yas present 111 court \Vhen his 
motion for ne\Y trial \Vas overruled, and apparently 
the only one \vho kne\v that it \Vas overruled because 
as shown by the record defendant's counsel proceeded 
to have it overruled again \vithout kno\Yledge that 
it had been thereto£ ore denied. 
In Cody r. Cody, 47 Utah 456; 154 Pac. 952, it 
appeared that the .plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce 
on Kovember 6, 1913. On June 19, 1914, 1nore than 
six months after the entry of judgment, the plaintiff 
appealed from the interlocutory decree entered on 
November 6, 1913. Plaintiff's counsel contended that 
his appeal \vas in time because no notice of original 
decision \Yas served upon plaintiff, as to this conten-
tion the court said and held: 
''As to the first p-roposition, we remark that 
the record is conclusive that the decree as entered 
was entirely in favor of the rplaintiff and that 
the same was prepared by her attorneys. Surely 
the statute requiring notice of a decision in order 
to set in motion the time for serving and filing 
a notice of motion for a new trial was not 
intended to apply to the party in whose favor 
the decision was given, when that party has pre-
pared the findings and conclusions, and decree, 
must of necessity, as pointed out by us in Jensen 
v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 Pac. 1036, be 
deemed to have notice of the decision, and hence 
is not entitled to further notice thereof. The 
plaintiff, -therefore, was not entitled to notice 
of the decision in the divorce proceedings, 'and 
hence her notice of motion for a new trial was 
not filed within the time required by our statute, 
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and it therefore could not be used as a means to 
extend the time within which to take an appeal.'' 
If these cases make it clear, as we submit they do, 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to notice of over-
ruling of the motion for a new trial when it was 
overruled upon his motion and as shown by the 
record in the absence of counsel for defendant, then 
it is clear that the· time within which a bill of excep-
tions s~ould have been prepared, served and filed 
commenced to run on Se'Ptember 6, 1949. 
The remaining question is whether or not the 
notice of appeal served on N ovemher 26, and filed 
on November 28 gave plaintiff a new and additional 
thirty days commencing on November 28, during which 
he could file his bill of exceptions~ Section 104-39-4 
1n subdivision 2, p~rovides : 
''In case 'an ap~eal is taken before the bill 
of exceptions is settled, service of the notices 
aforesaid shall not be necessary and tim·e shall 
run from service of his notice of appeal. '' 
This provision of the statute was analyzed in Findlay 
v. National Union Indemnity ·Co., 85 Utah 110; 38 Pac. 
(2d) 760. The court held the appeal method of start-
ing the time to run ''is applicable only when time has 
not already started to run either by notice or by 
the provisions of the statute without notice.'' (Page 
122· of 85 Utah.) 
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In that case it appeared that the plaintiff had 
judgn1ent on his Yerdirt and a motion for a new trial 
was denied on ~larch 15, 1932. Notice of denial of 
the motion was served on the 16th and filed on the 
17th of ~larch, 1932. Notice of appeal to the Supreme 
Court \Yas serYed and filed on the 2nd of April, 1932. 
On April 29, 1932, the District Court entered an order 
granting the defendant -and appellant sixty days frorn 
the 1st day of ~lay, 1932, in which to serve, settle 
and file the bill of exceptions. Respondent filed a 
motion to strike the bill of exceptions on the theory 
that the notice of denial- of Inotion for new trial 
started the time within which the hill should have 
been prepared running on March 17, 1932 and that 
the time expired at the end of thirty days. In hold-
ing that the filing of the notice of appeal did not-
start a new thirty-day period but was ap1plicable only 
when the time had not already been started by some 
other method, the court said : 
''When the time limitation fixed by the stat-
ute has been started running by any one of the 
methods provided by the statu.te, except by notice 
of appeal, may such time as has ·elapsed be cut 
off and the time st-arted to run -anew and from 
the date of the service of notice of appeal~ We 
think it was neither the purpose of the statute 
nor the intention of the Legislature in making 
the amendment to thus permit an extension of 
time when once started as •provided by the st-at-
ute: 'In case an appe-al is taken before the bill 
of exceptions is settled service of the notices 
afores-aid shall not be necessary' to start the 
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time running within which to prepare and serve 
the bill of ·exceptions. When the time has once 
been started by the service of the required notice, 
it may no more be cut off by serving and filing 
a subsequent notice of appeal than the time could 
be similarly cut off in case of entry of judg-
ment on a verdict where no notice is necessary 
in the absence of a motion for a new trial. The 
appeal method of starting the time to run is 
applicable only when time has not already been 
started to run either by notice or by the provi-
sion of the statute without notice.'' 
It therefore appears clear that since the· action of 
plaintiff's counsel in making the motion in open court 
that the motion for a new trial theretofore filed by the 
plaintiff should be denied is the equivalent of notice 
of denial upon that date and that plaintiff cannot 
thereafter assert that he is entitled to such written 
notice, and that the time within which the bill of 
exceptions in this case should have been prepared 
and filed commenced to run on September ·6, 1949, and 
expired on October 6, 1949, and that since that time 
had eXJpired when the new rule became effective 
appellant's effort to have the evidence in the case 
placed in the record in form of a . designation of 
record on a.pp.eal under the new civil rules is abortive 
and that the court should strike the purported tran-
script of official record and consider the appeal only 
on the judgment roll. 
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II. ST.A.TE~IENT OF THE FACTS UPON 
THE l\IERITS OF THE CASE. 
The case belo"~ \Yas tried ~o the court sitting 
without a jury. The court made findings and conclu-
sions and judgment in fayor of Utah Construction 
Company. The only question before this court is 
"'"hether the findings and judgment are supported by 
the record. The .a1ppellant alleges as error the court's 
conclusions of law number one, t\vo and three and 
that . the. judgment for defendant is erroneous. No 
errors are alleged relating to the admission or exchi-
sion of testimony. Appellant does not claim that the 
findings· of fact are not sup·ported by the testimony. 
Appellants own a farm on 33rd South .Street at 
80th West. Eightieth West Street, which is a public 
county road, extends south from the tailings .pond 
of Kennecott Copper Corporation. The respondent 
used this public highway to haul gravel from a pit 
south of appellant's farm to the tailings pond which 
is north of appellant's f.arm, to reinforce the earth 
bank. This suit involves only a period of approximately 
seven months of use commencing in July, 1948. 
In order to clarify the issue before this court it 
I 
IS proper to ask what facts are controlling in this 
case. We wish to emphasize .at the outset that we 
will not contend the trucks of respondent did not 
make any noise or dust. There are two fundamental 
reasons why the judgment of the trial court should 
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be sustained. First the record shows that the use of 
the highway was a proper and lawful use different 
only in degree from the use of highway by other 
users. The record shows there w~a.s an increased use 
and volume of traffic with the resulting increase in 
all the burdens sustained by those who live on such 
~ highway-noise and dust and verhap~s some fumes. 
Second, the appellant's suit is based on the theory 
of a nuisance and the measure of damages is the 
depreciation in the market value of his farm. There 
is ·no evidence in the record that his farm has depre-
ciated in market value in any sum. There is no testi-
mony showing the sale or rental v;alue before or after 
-the operation of the trucks of respondent. The court 
could not make a finding that the appellant had sus-
tained one dollar in damages by reason of the defend-
ant's use of the public highway. The loss of sale value 
or rental value must be based on direct testimony. 
The record shows that the plaintiff had filed a 
prior suit against the same defendant in which he had 
alleged that in a prior period the Utah Construction 
Company had dam·aged his home because of the O!pera-
tion of its trucks on the public highway. On October 
16, 1946, the former case was settled and the plaintiff 
received $3,000 and signed a release in full for all 
damages theretofore sustained. (Exhibit 17) Respond-
ent introduced the complaint and release not as a bar 
to the present suit between the sanie parties but to 
·show that according to plaintiff's sworn complaint 
the cracks in his house were there when the respondent 
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commenced its truck operations in July, 1948. Appel-
lant could not reeoYer t"'"ice for the eracks he alleged 
'Yere caused prior to October 16, 1946. He had the 
burden of proving the extent in dollars of the darn-
age (depreciation in market value), if any, which 
resulted from the second hauling period. There was . 
testimony that the old cracks had opened up worse but 
no attempt \Yas made to show depreciation in market 
value caused by the second !period of operation as dis-
tinguished from the prior period which was settled. 
This is a law case, being an action for damages to 
real estate. The defendant in the court below had 
no burden of proof to discharge and it is accurate 
to state that the judgment of the trial court must 
stand unless the evidence in support of plaintiffs' 
theory of the case is so convincing that to fail to 
find in £a.vor of the plaintiff would be arbitrary and 
capricious. The Supreme Court in this case does not 
have the obligation nor the power to weigh the evi-
dence as it . would in an equity case and constitute 
itself a body to find the facts from the preponderance 
of the weight of the testimony, but it is only concerned 
with the question of whether there is sufficient testi-
mony in the record so that a finding for the defendant 
upon the issues involved would not be arbitrary with-
out sup·port in the testimony. 
It therefore becomes useful to examine the testi-
mony produced on behalf of defendant. J. Melvin 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
Paulson testified that he was superintendent of the 
Utah Construction Company and had started to work 
on the job in question on F·ebruary 1, 1945. What 
has been referred to as the first job started D·ecember 
28, 1944, and lasted about three months (R. 167). 
The second job, or the one involved in this lawsuit, 
commenced the 26th of July, 1948, and ended 
after seven months (R. 65). The trucks started run-
ning at five o'clock in the morning and ran until 
eleven o'clock P.M., with thirty minutes out on each 
shift for lunch. Drivers were changed at two o'clock 
in the afternoon. The gross load is from 81,000 to 
84,000 pounds. They had six pneumatic tires, and 
Exhibit 12, which is a photograph, shows one of the 
larger u.nits. The tires are about five feet in diameter 
and about fourteen inches across the face of the 
tire. There would be a trn·ck passing a given point 
in one direction or the other app.roximately every three 
minutes (R. 170). Delays frequently occurred resulting 
from break-downs. 
''A. Prior to the beginning of our operation 
in July of 1948 we oiled the road and ~ut a coat 
of slag from the smelter on top of the oil coat 
to reduce the dust and to sink into the oil. As 
time went on and some dust perhaps accumulated 
on the road we used ~a sp·rinkler truck to operate 
back and forth, up and down 80th West con-
stantly." (R. 171). 
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The attention of the 'vitness was called to Exhibit 
5, and he then testified .as follows : 
'' Q. Did you observe that house or that part 
of the house or crack prior to July 26 in 1948, 
in the year 1948 '? 
"A. At ~Ir. Coon's request I went in and 
looked at the condition of his home in the spring 
of 1945 and he called this particular corner to 
my attention, stating he had plastered that up 
in October of 1944 and showed me that there 
was an additional crack that had developed after 
it had been plastered. 
"Q. This is what he told you at what time 
in 1945~ 
''A. This was in the spring of 1945, either 
the last of March or early in April. 
"Q. That was at the end of what you call 
the first job, approximately that~ 
''A. Yes sir, yes sir." (R. 178-179) 
At page 135 of the record the witness who had 
testified that the crack shown in Exhibit 5 was in the 
house in 1945 and testified that he S'aw it agam 1n 
1948 when the second job was in ~progress, testified: 
'' Q. Did you observe this corner of the house~ 
''A. I did from the roadway. 
"Q. And did you observe it at intervals 
after that~ 
''A. Yes sir. 
''Q. Now do you have any opinion as to 
whether or not there is any change in that from 
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the time that you first saw it in 1945 until the 
present time~ 
''A. I don't think there is any change what-
soever.'' ( R. 180-181) 
Mr. Paulson further testified that the horsepower 
of the diesel motors used in the Euclid trucks was 
150 horsepower and that the commercial transports 
used on highways generally have h~rsepower ranging 
from 150 to 275. 
With respect to the dust we find the following 
at page 140 of the transcript: 
'' Q. And why was it necessary a little later 
to put a sprinkler on an oiled road? 
''A. With the hauling equipment and the 
travel of the public there was- a little dust accumu-
lated on the road and knowing the attitude of 
the people on 80th West we made it a special 
point to not only oil the road but to sprinkle 
it frequently to keep down the dust and there 
was no dust. 
'' Q. There wasn't any dust at all~ 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Not at any time~ 
''A. Not ·at any time except perhaps when 
we would have a hot, dry spell.'' (R. 185-186) 
Two sprinklers were available for sprinkling the 
road so that one or the other of the trucks was operat-
ing constantly, day and night, except when there was 
rain. (R. 188) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
,, ... ith respect to the alleged damage to the house 
resulting fron1 Yibration caused by 1noving of the 
trucks on the high,Yay, l\lr. Paulson testified at :page 
150 of the transcript : 
"Q. And is it your testimony that this vibra-
tion of those trucks didn't do any damage to 
the house' 
"A. Yes sir.'' 
* * * * * 
"Q. Now I ask you upon what ·you base 
your conclusion' 
''A. I don't think the trucks would cause 
any damage from vibration.'' (R. 195) 
On cross-examination Mr. Paulson "\Vas asked: 
"Q. v\'hat caused the cracks~ 
''A. Old age and settlement. 
"Q. This is a brick house, is it not' -
''A. Insufficient foundation. ' ' 
* * * * * 
"Q. And when did you see it before~ 
''A. 1945. 
"Q. That wa·s when you were operating your 
trucks' 
''A. We h-ad finished the operation at that 
time. 
''Q. But there had been operation for three 
months when you saw the house' 
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''A. That is correct, but Mr. Coon showed 
1ne the crack in this pillar in the spring of '45 
and said he had plastered that three-quarter-inch 
crack up in October of '44." (R. 196-197) 
Mr. Percival Young, a general contractor who had 
made a special study of causes of cracking in houses, 
when sho,vn Exhibit 5, testified: 
·"A. That is a picture taken of the southeast 
corner, near the enclosed porch and in the gen-
eral direction of north and west and that picture 
was taken to show the crack at that point~ 
'' Q. And will you describe for the record 
the nature of that crack~ 
''A. That is what we normally term :a settle-
ment crack occurring at the corner of the house. 
'' Q. Would you have an opinion as to how 
long it has taken that crack to develop~ 
''A. Oh, I would say that that crack has 
been in there for as much as twenty years." 
* * * * * 
"A. This house at this point has no basement 
under it. It has no gutters on the edge of the 
roof and it has been my exi>erience that as the 
water runs off the roof it collects 'and seeps along 
the foundation walls. If the walls aren't deep 
enough and if the footings aren't wide enough 
it develops a spongy eondition and causes set-
tlement.'' 
* * * * * 
... ' ' Q. Is it the general rule or is it the excep-
tion to find houses with cracks in them~ 
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" .... \. I have never yet seen a. house without 
cracks in it." 
* * * • * 
"Q. Does that Exhibit or the previous Ex-
hibit, "\Yhich you haYe identified Or diSCUSSed, in 
your opinion sho'v any damage vvhich resulted 
from vibration~ 
' '.L\. I have never been able to recognize 
damage from vibration. 
''Q. You mean in that house~ 
"A. Not in this house." (R. 210-214) 
Examining Exhibit 6, the witness Young testified: 
'' Q. The porch slab that is like a concrete 
sidewalk that is placed on dirt fill in order to 
bring the porch level up to approximately the 
main level of the house. It is like a concrete side-
walk setting on this dirt fill. After the brick-
work is com:pleted it is pou:red against the brick-
work.'' 
• * * * * 
''A. Now these cracks of this nature we 
term as shrinkage cracks. Whenever you build 
-anything from concrete as the concrete cures or 
takes its set it shrinks. That is the reason we 
put expansion joints in sidewalks and I have 
never read a specification for a building which 
didn't say that wherever a concrete slab or any 
other concrete material is put that an expansion 
joint must be placed there. Now if a person 
doesn't want an unsightly joint in a place like 
that the only way I know of to correct it is to 
cast it against an expansion joint and I am quite 
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positive this is what we term a shrinkage crack 
in the concrete. I cover in my opinion the crack 
in the porch slab. The other crack, that vertical 
crack, I have described as a crack five-eighths of 
an inch wide maximum. That would be at the 
maximum .point between bricks, and here is a 
structure some forty-six feet long, north and 
south, and as I remember about thirty feet wide, 
east and west. From the high temperatures in 
the summer to the cold tem:peratures in the 
winter there is quite a variation; some move-
ment due to expansion and contraction. We gen-
erally term this ·a.s an expansion crack. The rea-
son it occurred at that point is that this concrete 
block wall terminated at this point -and is not 
bonded or tied in to the brick. Nor was there 
b-ond in these three courses of brick above.'' 
* * * • * 
- '' Q. In your opinion, did the cracks that you 
have identified and discussed in this Exhibit 
result from vibration~ 
"A. No." (R. 214-216) 
Mr. Mervin B. Hogan, Professor of Engineering 
at the University of Utah, who holds a Doctor of 
Philosophy Degree from the University of Michigan 
(19~6), testified as an expert witness on behalf of 
the defendant. He was employed by the defendant in 
April, 1948, to scientifically measure the claimed vibra-
tion in the plaintiff's house, as well as the noise 
resulting from the defendant's operation on the high-
way. On April 17, 1948, the defendant op·erated its 
Euclid trucks, both loaded and empty, just as they 
vvere operated during the 1period of time involved in 
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the la,vsuit, in order to enable 1\lr. Hogan to measure 
the noise and rlaimed Yibration. 1\Ir. Paulson at page 
~~1 of the record testified that he \Yas present at 
these tests, and the same trucks \Yere loaded with 
substantially the SHine loads and operated at a Speed 
of not to exceed ~0 m.p.h. loaded, or 25 m.p.h. empty, 
and that during· the regular operations the drivers 
were instructed to travel at that speed and were 
checked by the Assistant Sup·erintendent, Job Fore-
man, or Safety Engineer at different intervals. 
The instrument used by Professor Hogan to meas-
ure vibration is called a falling pin seisomometer, 
·which consists of a perfectly horizontal 'piece of glass, 
upon which are placed six rods one-fourth inch in 
diameter. The rods stand perpendicularly on their 
ends and are from 6 to 15 inches in length, and 
machined square on the ends. If vibration causes 
disturbance of the glass base on which they are stand-
ing, they will sway or fall over within a tube which 
is one and one-eighth inches in diameter and acts as 
a compartment for the rod so that one falling rod 
will not disturb other rods. It is .a well recognized, 
practical instrument for the purpose of measuring 
vibrations, resulting from heavy traffic (R. 197). 
The instrument was first set up on the west side of 
the highway (80th West) a little south and east of the 
Coon's residence, and as the Euclid_s passed back and 
forth, ''there was no discernible disturbance whatever 
indicated by the instrument.'' The instr?ment was 
next set up on the back porch of Mr. Coon's home 
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in the presence of and with Mr. Coon's consent. There 
was again no disturbance. "However, it was observed 
by all of us that anyone 'valking on the floor would 
cause those jpins to be disturbed" (R. 244). The pins' 
did not tip over, but they wobbled on their base. At 
Mr. Coon's suggestion, the instrument was then placed 
on the table inside the kitchen with exactly the same 
results. "There was no evidence of any disturbance 
as the trucks went by.'' It was noticed, however, that 
when Mr. Coon's little grandchild walked .around on 
the floor these pins were obviously wobbling (R. 244). 
At Mr. Coon's suggestion, the instrument was then 
placed on the table in the dining room. 
''So I set the instrument up again and ob-
served it as the Euclids went by and the 12-
inch pin, I believe it was, again slightly quivered. 
It was an ~xtremely questionable ·obs·ervation. I 
give it the benefit of the doubt and say it 
quivered slightly. Again that could .have been 
attributed just as easily to one of us moving his 
foot slightly on the floor as to any ·extra disturb-
ance." (R. 247) 
On December 16, 1948, which was within the period 
of the regular operation of the defendant, Professor 
Hogan made measurements of sound at the Coon 
home when the trucks were operating, by using a 
Type 759-B Sound Level Meter (R. 248). ''This is 
an electronic device constructed and standardized, rec-
ognized by the American Standards Association as to 
its construction and it is the nationally used instrument 
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for n1aking sound leYel readings'' ( R. 248) The instru-
Inent ha.s a scale 'vhich is calibrated from zero to one 
hundred decibels. The instrun1ent was set up at 35th 
South and 80th "\\;est, and 25 feet "\Vest of the center 
line of 80th \Vest, 'vhich is on the highway joining 
the home of ~Ir. Coon, and on which the trucks were 
operating. 
"I observed six Euclid trucks going south, 
upgrade, 'vith a mean reading of 90 decibels 
and maximum reading of 99.5 decibels. The 
numerical average is 94.9 for those six 
Euclids going south upgrade. While there I ob-
served three commercial vehicles or ordinary pas-
senger cars going along 35th South. Again just 
for comparison's sake a commercial truck going 
east with a reading of 91 decibels; a passenger 
car going east, 78 ; a commercial truck with a 
reading of 88 going east. The mean reading of 
the three being 86.3 decibels." (R. 251) 
For further comparison, Professor Hogan took the 
instrument out on State Street, opposite the American 
Smelting & Refining Company 1plant, which seemed 
to him to afford a typical e~ample of ordinary county 
highway .traffic. 
'' . . . The northbound traffic ranged from a 
minimum of 72 to a maximum ·of 89, with a 
numerical mean of 81 decibels. The southbound 
traffic had a minimum of 66 decibels and a maxi-
mum of 82, the numerical mean being 73. I would 
like to make it clear that at this point I .am on 
the east side of the highway. Southbound traffic 
is removed from the instrument considerably 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
farther than the northbound which ·of course 
accounts for the difference there in the two read-
ings or the mean readings. While at that particu-
lar spot I observed several heavier trucks par-
ticularly. There was a snow vlow going south-
bound that gave a decibel reading of 85 ; a diesel 
truck that gave a reading of 86 going south. 
Another one s-outhbQund making a reading of 
90; a heavy commercial truck which read 93; 
the mean of that ordinary heavier traffic being 
88.5. Then I moved farther south on State Street 
to 5300, right at the marker indicating the south 
reading of 53 rd. I was ten feet west· of the pave-
ment edge. There is a mile upgrade for the 
southbound traffic there I felt possibly simu-
lated the grade going south, or to the east of 
Mr. Coon's home. I made six readings of trucks 
there. The minimum was 79, the maximum was 
86, with a mean of 83.5. I read six passenger 
cars, those likewise with a minimum of 69 and 
a maximum of 75, with a mean of 72.7 decibels. 
That should, I feel,. give a very satisfactory 
check on the county traffic so as to offer some 
information. Regarding the city commercial 
traffic I took the instrument to Second West and 
9th South Streets where, as we all know, a good 
deal of commercial traffic p·asses. I made a 
reading of a traction bus at that intersection of 
7 4 decibels ; a diesel truck at 75 decibels; a heavy 
truck 88 decibels, with a mean ·of 82.3 decibels 
at that particular point. In order to check a 
little further I took the instrument out 'at 1199 
Beck Street, which is the Second West highway 
going north and the address is that of the 
State Highway Commission storage shed and 
supply station on the west side of ·the street. 
I set the instrument up alongside the fence there 
on the west side of the highw·ay, thirty-five feet 
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from the center line of the highway. I made 
readings of the southbound traffic going into 
the city. There is a slight grade there 'and I 
observed that ordinary passenger cars ranged 
from 68 to 78 decibels at that vicinity, with a 
mean of 75. 
'' Q. Excuse me. Were you on the west side 
of the highway¥ 
''A. The west side of the highway, yes sir. 
"THE COURT : A mean of what¥ 
''A. A mean of 75 decibels. I observed an 
oil truck-its reading was 84; another oil truck 
85; a diesel truck 87 decibels. A P .I.E. truck 
that exceeded a hundred; a P.I.E._ truck 91 and 
a P .I.E. truck 87; an oil tanker 97; a traction 
bus, ordinary traction bus 89. Another traction 
bus 84 and a heavy truck 84. The mean of those 
is 89. Those constitute the data that I obtained 
with the sound level instrument on this test of De-
cember 16th." (R. 252-3-4) 
It was Professor Hogan's conclusion: 
'' ... If any one of the six pins remain stand-
ing we would say there has not been potentially 
damaging vibration in evidence.'' 
III. ARGUMENT UPON THE MERITS. 
(A) AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE EVIDENCE FAILED 
TO SHOW APPELLANTS HAD ANY CAUSE OF ACTION. 
It is significant that appellant's brief · does not 
contain any cases similar in its facts to the case at 
bar. Stripped of non-essentials appellant claims he 
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is entitled to damages because the use of the public 
highway annoys and disturbs the appellant. The ap-
pellant in his brief does not contend that the construc-
tion company was negligent in any of its operations 
or that the appellant's rights of ingress or egress 
were violated by the construction company. While the 
appellant does not abandon his claim of damage to 
his. house by means of vibration from the trucks, the 
Trial Judge found that the appellant did not sustain 
any physical damage to his real or personal property 
as a result of respondent's oper~ations, 
'' . . . the cause of such cracks and moving 
out of line has been the settling and sinking of 
said foundation and has been caused by the na-
tural elements and the passing of years and is 
not the result of the operations of the defendant's 
Euclid trucks in whole or in part.'' 
The evidence in the record sustains this finding 
of fact so the case must be examined from the original 
proposition, viz., did the operations of respondent's 
trucks which admittedly caused some noise and fumes 
and dust incident to careful truck operation create 
in appellant a cause of action for damages to his real 
·estate~ The record shows the horsepower of the diesel 
engines used in the trucks operated by respondent was 
150 H.P. Commercial vehicles on the highway hauling 
heavy loads frequently use 250 H.P. diesel engines. 
The noise of the trucks here involved is about the 
same as heavy duty trucks on the main highways 
where Mr. Hogan made the measurements of the noise 
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in decibels. Ordinary motor cars or trucks had average 
decibel readings near the Coon residence of 86.3 decibels 
(R. :251). The average for _the trucks of defendant 
was 94.9 decibels. Frequent passage of cars and trucks 
makes a noise \vhether they are operated by the 
respondent or other travelers on the highway. The 
passage of a truck every 2¥2 minutes would mean 
that only 12 trucks go north and 12 trucks go south 
in an hour. Certainly that is not "heavy traffic" 
when compared with the volume of traffic which passes 
on any of our main busy highways leading from any 
of the larger cities of the state. . The record, when 
supplemented by matters of common knowledge of 
which this eourt takes judicial notice, supports the 
inference that there are many hundreds of miles of 
highway in this state which are noisier than the one 
on which Mr. Coon lives-both in volume of sound 
and continuity of sound. The Euclid trucks of respond-
ent were out of use from 11 P.M. to 5 A.M. whereas 
our busy highways are in use day and night. It is 
not difficult to understand why there are no cases 
where recovery was allowed against one who used 
the public highway for the purpose and in the manner 
it was intended to be used. Such a fact situation simply 
does not spell out a cause of action. 
Another reason why such cases have not shown 
up in the courts is becaus·e the state and its sub-
divisions have pre-empted the field of highway and 
motor vehicle regulation and control. An early (1905) 
California case tested the validity of an ordinance of 
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Marin County which made it a crime to operate an 
automobile between sunset and sunrise. The court 
observed that fearful accidents to ~ersons driving 
animals which are frightened into unmanageable terror 
by automobiles are of common occurrence. As country 
horses are driven into cities and become used to auto-
mobiles the danger of their use on country roads will 
grow less. The ordinance was held reasonable (Ex 
parte Berry, 82 P. 44). 
Title 36 of Utah Code Annotated relates to high-
ways. Section 1-28 and 29-30 governs the size and 
weight arid dimensions of vehicles including the size 
of tires for the weight of the load. Section 33 provides 
for special permits for excessive loads and Section 34 
p·rovides for restricted use because of climatic condi-
tions, when operation of motor vehicles would damage 
the highway. Section 36-1-33 provides for special per-
mits for excessive loads. It would be a strange legal 
anomaly if one who owned a home abutting on the 
highway could recover da~ages becaus·e of the opera-
tion of vehicles under such special permits in the 
absence of ,physical damage and upon proof merely 
that the excessive loads caused excessive noise and 
fumes. There is an inevitable conflict of interest be-
tween those who live adjacent to the highways and 
those who travel upon them. The court takes judicial 
notice of the efforts of public authorities to compose 
this conflict. Certain residential areas are given a 
reduced speed limit. Certain streets are given one 
way traffic and traffic is prohibited on some streets 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
at certain hours to permit children to play on them. 
Appellant's remedy, if any, is to obtain state or 
county or municipal legislation to restore the streets 
\Vhich intersect in front of his house to their original 
status as country lanes on w~ich the surrey with the 
fringe on top lurched through the mud of winter or the 
dirt road of summer but was no doubt less frequent 
and less noisy than present-day traffic. 
Section 57-7-207 of the motor vehicle code :provides:-
''Every motor vehicle shall at all tim~s be 
equipped with a muffler in good working order 
and in constant operation to p~revent excessive 
or unusual noise and annoying smoke, and no 
person shall use a muffler cutout, by-pass or 
similar device upon a motor vehicle o~ a high-
way.'' 
It will not be disputed that the road commission 
could .and would deny the use of the highways to 
vehicles which caused ''excessive or unusual' noise 
or ''annoying smoke". The fact that resp~ondents were 
allowed to operate raises a presumption that their 
vehicles did not produce excessive or unusual noise or 
annoying smoke. 
Section 57-7-113 contains speed restrictions. The 
court found respondent's sp·eed was 20 miles per hour 
and appellant does not claim in his brief that this 
finding is not supported by the evidence. No claim is 
made that the sp~eed was excessive.-
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In 1909 the Supreme Court of Utah decided a 
case which is strikingly similar to this one. Twenty-
Second Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 
36 Utah 238, 103 P. 243. The headnotes reflect the 
holding of the court. 
"The interference with religious services by 
the annoyance from the noises in the rightful 
operation of a railroad and train yards near a 
church, without any physical interference with 
the church property, does not .give the religious 
society a right of action for damages against the 
railroad company, under the provision of Const. 
art. I, sec. 22, that 'private property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation.' '' 
''The interference with religious services by 
the annoyance from the noises in the rightful 
operation of a railroad and train yards near a 
church, without 'allY physical interference with 
the church property, is not a private nuisance 
giving the religious society a cause of action 
against the railroad company.'' 
That case was an action by the Church against 
the Railroad, for ·damages ·caused by noise and smoke 
from trains interfering with the use of the adjacent 
property for religious purposes. 
The court held the def.endan t w-as not liable and 
said: 
''Does the operation of a railroad by passing 
of trains whether few or many, when operated 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
"~ith ordinary care, constitute either a public 
or a p~ivate nuisance~ Can the noises that 
emanate from moving trains be eliminated with-
out preventing the trains from running at all~ 
Moreover, do not such noises affect all who are 
similarly situated along the line of the railroad~ 
If not in the same degree, do they not affect all 
to some extent~ If this be so, how can it be said 
that in a legal sense such noises constitute a 
nuisance either public or priva.te ~ The Court 
of Appeals of New York, in a comparatively 
recent case, namely, Bennett v. Long Island R. 
Co., 181 N.Y. 431, 74 N.E. 418, in passing upon 
this point, uses the following language ~ ' The 
rumble of trains, the cl·anging of bells, the shriek 
of whistles, the blowing off of steam, the dis-
cordant squeak of wheels in going around curves, 
the emission of smoke, soot, and cinders, all of 
which accompany the operation of steam cars, 
are undoubtedly nuisances to the neighboring 
dwellings in the 1popular sense; but, as they are 
necessarily incident to the maintenance of the 
road, they do not constitute nuisances in the 
legal sense, but are regarded as protected by 
legislative authority which created the corpora-
tion and legalized its corporate ·operations. Nor 
does the legal nature of such annoy·ances change 
as traffic increases them in volume and extent. ' '' 
A recent federal court case from the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals is Thompson v. Kimball, 165 
F. (2d) 677, decided in 1948. Kimball constructed or 
acquired a house in Omaha, Nebraska, adjacent to an 
existing railroad track and switch yard of the Missouri 
Pacific Railroad operated by Thompson as trustee in 
bankruptcy. Kimball alleged and proved that since 
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1937 the railroad had put an engine on its track 
directly in front of his hous·e four or five times a 
da.y for about twenty minutes and during this time 
the fireman shook the ashes out of the grates and 
built up the fire by adding coal. This process caused 
the engine to emit quantities of smoke, soot, cinders 
and steam. It was the theory of Kimball's attorney 
and the trial court found spotting the engines nearer 
to plaintiff's property than was necessary resulted in 
an unnecessary nuisance and allowed recovery. The 
decision belo'v was reversed. The court held that the 
fact that the defendant could stand its engines in front 
of another person's house instead of plaintiff's did 
not make a private nuisanee and support recovery. 
Plaintiff claimed that the recent building of additional 
tracks nearer to plaintiff's house cast a new burden 
upon his house and premises which did not exist before 
that tim·e and that for such added burden he was 
entitled to damages. The. court, holding that such 
additional us-e and construction was · within the pur-
view of the original location quoted from an earlier 
Nebraska case: 
'' . . . The evidence shows that within four 
years prior to the bringing of this suit the rail-
way company constructed in the street, opposite 
the 0 'Connor property, an additional side track 
for use in connection with its coal house. This 
dd not confer upon O'Connor 'any cause of action 
against the railway company. If a railway com-
pany condemns real estate for the erection there-
on of a road, and builds one track thereon, then 
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we are of the opinion that the building of one 
or more additional tracks on the same right of 
way, and on the same ·profile or grade, that such 
additional tracks should be construed to be with-
in the purview and purposes of the original con-
demnation. '' 
and said: 
''The court also stated that all elements of 
damage to property by reason of building a rail-
road in front of it and its continuous and proper 
operation must be included in the original settle-
ment of damages; that it is common knowledge 
that a railway cannot be operated without smoke 
and soot; and that these things are within the 
realm of what would probobly result from the 
proper and ordinary operation of the railway as 
constructed and are a p;art of the damages ~rop­
erly sustained by the original location and use of 
the railway.'' 
The parallel between the case at bar and the federal 
court case is obvious. When Mr. Coon built his house 
at the intersection of 33rd South and 80th West he 
wanted the convenience of living on two public high-
ways. He must accept th,at convenience burdened with 
the common knowledge that highways carry traffic 
which makes noise and dust and fumes when operated 
in the normal ordinary manner. The original location 
of the highways whether by condemnation or grant 
result·ed in Mr. Coon or his predecessor in the title 
being paid for all elements of damage to the p·roperty, 
past and future. 
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Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 186 P. (2d) 556. 
The City of Cheyenne, located in the midst of nothing 
but room, is a bottleneck for traffic. The city 'Passed 
an ordinance requiring all commercial motor carriers 
passing through the city to follow a specified through 
route. The suit was by an owner of residence property 
abutting the truck route for himself and all others 
sintilarly situated to enjoin the enforcement of the 
ordinance. It was alleged and proved that the trucks 
made dust, noise, fumes and traffic hazards-that much 
of the area is residential and zoned as to kind and 
cost of buildings to be erected thereon. The ordinance 
made it mandatory for trucks passing through the 
city to take the specified route passing plaintiffs' houses. 
The court in an exhaustive opinion written by Judge 
Blume held the ordinance valid and within the powers 
granted by the Constitution and statutes of Wyoming. 
The discussion which is in point on the issues in the 
case at bar is found in subheads 22 to 25, inclusive, 
beginning at page 570. The court held that the plain-
tiffs had no rights which were infringed by the enforce-
ment of this ordinance. Admitting that motor vehicles 
create nois-e and dust and fumes and vibration which 
did not exist in the same volume before the ordinance 
was ,pas,sed, the use of the highway was legal and 
plaintiff had no right to the abs-ence of heavy traffic. 
The case is so clearly parallel to this one that we quote 
at length from the well reasoned opinion : 
''The streets, as the petition shows have been 
dedicated to the public. The auth~rities are 
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unanimous in holding that streets are dedicated 
or other,Yise established primarily for the public 
who haYe a common right to the use thereof, 
and 'vho n1ay make such use thereof by all the 
usual modes of travel thereon, including by 
vehicles which advancing civilization may find 
convenient ·and proper. Abutting property owners 
haYe no greater rights therein and thereto than 
the public generally, except only that they have 
the additional right of ingress and egress and 
of a few other analogous rights such as light 
and air. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad 
Company v. West Chicago Street Railroad Com-
pany, 156 lll. 255, 40 N.E. 1008, 29 L.R.A. 485; 
State ex rei. State B;ighway Commission v. Cox, 
336 Mo. 271, 77 S.W. 2d 116; City of Elmhurst 
v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N .E. 2d 278, 281; 
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 
71 A.L.R. 604; 25 Am. Jur. 434, 448-455, 456-459, 
Dillon, M uniciJ>al Corporations, 5th Ed., Sec. 
1248; 40 C.J.S., Highways, Sec. 233. 'Dedication 
or condemnation of a street,' . it has been said, 
'contemplates the most onerous and injurious 
mode of use to which it can be lawfully devoted.' 
Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 
P. 2d 721, 726. Plaintiffs bought and improved 
their property with the knowledge of these facts 
and their erroneous belief that no change· in 
conditions would ensue is one that has not been 
uncommon in growing communities, but for which 
there is ordinarily no remedy in the courts. See 
3-4 Huddy Cyciopedia of Automobile L·aw, 9th 
Ed., Sec. 2. Plaintiffs seek, in effect, to enjoin 
commercial through truckers from using the 
streets designated by the ordinance in question, 
though, it is true, they attempt to do so by 
indirection. But these truckers travel by a mode 
vvhich is usual and accepted, and they are free 
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to use the streets above mentioned. If they can 
be kept off these streets, it can only be done by 
a regulation of the municipal authorities which 
represent the public. Plaintiffs claim in their 
petition, their argument in this court, and infer-
entially by their testimony, that such use by the 
truckers constitutes a nuisance. That contention 
finds no support· whatever in any of the auhori-
ties. If, in the absence of the ordinance in ques-
tion, truckers should voluntarily choose to use 
the route now designated by the ordinance, the 
abutting :property owners would not, under the 
foregoing rules, have any remedy whatever. And 
the evidence in the case shows that many of them 
in fact choose to use it. If, in the absence of 
such ordinance, the truckers should use the route 
so designated pursuant to the mere advice of 
the city authorities the result would, we think, 
be the same. The mere direction of the city 
authorities that truckers shall use the designated 
streets in the ordinance cannot create a nuisance 
if no nuisance in fact existed without such direc-
tion. The privilege of truckers to use the routes 
de signa ted by the ordinance is clearly inconsist-
ent with the claim that the use by them of these 
routes constitutes a public or a private nui-
sance. See Elliott on Roads and Streets, 4th 
Ed., Sec. 1108; 1-2 Huddy, supra, Sec. 44. If 
it were such nuisance, it would be equally so 
when traveling along Central Avenue and the 
Lincoln Highway, and in such case the city 
should prohibit the use of all of the streets by 
them entirely. That that cannot be done is recog-
nized even by counsel for the plaintiffs himself. 
The ere a tion of noise, dust, dirt and danger to 
children by such trucks cannot be denied. These 
evils would be equally bad on almost any of 
the streets. They are unfortunate concomitants 
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loud cry to Heaven if any legislative body should 
attempt to forbid their use. In Roebling v. Tren-
ton Pass. Ry. Co., 58 N.J.L. 666, 674, 34 A. 1090, 
1093, 33 L.R .... \. 129, the court stated: 'The 
owner of lands abutting a street holds his title 
subject to the inconveniences and injurious con-
sequences, including those occasioned by noise 
and vibration, resulting from a user which is 
consistent with the legitimate and proper use to 
which these public thoroughfares are devoted.' 
In Cadwell v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 
84 Conn. 450, 80 A. 285, 287, the court, speaking 
of a street railway, stated: 
"It is bound to conduct its business with a 
reasonable regard under the circumstances for 
the rights of others. This does not, however, sig-
nify that every annoyance, inconvenience or 
feature, which might be regarded as objectionable, 
and to which damage might be traced, attending 
the construction or operation of 'a street railway 
furnishes the foundation of an action. 
"Certain. unpleasant, inconvenient, and dis-
turbing features, from the point of view of an 
adjoining owner; naturally attend public travel 
upon a highway, if there is any considerable 
amount of it. This is distinctly true of highway 
use by street cars, and the greater the public 
demand and service, the greater these features 
ralmost certainly are. Dust cannot well he kept 
down, and vibration and noise in some measure 
is inevitable. Such things as these and other 
annoyances and-inconveniences which result from 
a user of a highway which is consistent with a 
legitimate and proper use of it as :a public thor-
oughfare are among the penalties which a mod-
ern and busy life imposes up.on those who come 
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closest in contact with it. A user of a highway 
by a street railway forms no exception. ·Certain 
objectionable results ·are among its natural inci-
dents. In so far as this is the case, and the 
consequences complained of flovv naturally and 
normally from the conduct of the traffic under 
·proper authority, in a reasonable manner and 
\vith due regard for the rights of others, one 
\vho conceives that he has been injured can have 
no redress.'' 
''The case is cited with approval in Nuttle 
v. 'Vichita R. & Light Co., 123 Kan. 517, 256 P. 
128, "'here a number of similar or analogous cases 
are cited. To the same effect also see State v. 
Hartford St. Ry. Co., 76 ·Conn. i 7 4, 56 A. 506. 
That the principle involved in these cases and 
in the case at bar is the same is clear. 
''We should, finally, inquire whether an addi-
tional servitude has been imposed upon the 
streets by the ordinance in question to which 
the abutting property owners can object. The 
precise question is as to whether or not the 
artificial increase of travel thereon by trucks 
which may be caused by the ordinance, is such 
additional servitude. There is no direct author-
ity on the point. This is the first case on rec-
ord, so far as we know, in which abutting prop-
erty owners have objected to a regulation simi-
lar to that in this case. Many analogous cases 
have held in the negative. It is almost uni-
versally held that the. use of streets by street 
railWiays pursuant to a franchise is not an addi-
tional burden for which abutting property own-
ers are entitled to compensation, and to which, 
accordingly they cannot object. Elliott, Roads 
and Streets, 4th Ed., Sec. 886; McQuillin, supra, 
Sec. 1843; see 44 C.J. 986. In Kipp v. Davis-
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Daly Cooper Company, 41 I\font. 509, 110 P. 
237, 240, 36 L.R.A., N.S., 666, :21 Ann. Cas. 
137:2, the plaintiffs, abutting property owners, 
brought suit to enjoin the defendant from con-
structing a street railway along their street, 
pursuant to a franchise. The court held that 
plaintiffs had no cause of action, and were not 
entitled to any compensation by reason of such 
construction. The fee of the street was vested 
in the city, as the fee of the streets is vested 
in the City of Cheyenne, pursuant to Sec. 
29-1209, \""\T yo. Compiled Statutes of 1945. The 
court, among other things, said: 'But it is 
not important to inquire where the fee is vested. 
The respective rights of the abutting owner 
and the public are dependant upon the fact 
of dedication. In view of these i>rovisions as 
well as of the rule of law recognized every-
where, the authorities which control streets 
and highways may use or permit the use · of 
them in any manner or for any purpose which 
is reasonably incident to the appropriation of 
them to public travel and to the ordinary uses 
of streets or highways under the different con-
ditions which arise from time to time. White 
v. Blanchard Bros. (Granite Co.), 178 Mass. 
363, 59 N.E. 1025. For a highway is created 
for the use of the public, not only in view 
of its necessities and requirements as they 
exist, but also in view of the constantly chang-
ing modes and conditions of travel and trans-
portation, brought about by improved methods 
and required by the increase of population and 
the exp.ansion in the volume of traffic due 
to the ever-increasing needs · of society. Were 
this not so, any change in these resp·ects would 
require a readjustment of rights as between 
the vublic and the abutting property owner, 
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because the result of it would- of necessity 
be held an imposition of a new burden upon 
the highway, and hence upon the property of 
the abutting owner.' If abutting property own-
ers cannot object in such a case, it is difficult 
to see how they can object in a case such as 
is before us. If there is any difference,- it is 
merely one of degree, not of kind. There 
is one distinction. The rights or privileges of 
truckers to the use of streets are greater than 
those of the operators of a street railway. The 
latter need a franchise, the former do not. 
The difference in effect, if any, would be to 
strengthen our conclusion herein, rather than 
to weaken it.'' 
The Utah case, Twenty-Second Ward v. Oregon 
Short Line Railroad (supra), holding a railroad is not 
liable for the annoyance- resulting to adjoining prop-
erty owners from its non-negligent operation, is in 
line with the authorities which seem to be uniform. 
The rhird Circuit Court of Appeals in 1913 decided 
Roman Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 207 F. 
897. The holding is reflected in the headnotes: 
''The consequential, incidental, and unavoid-
able annoyance or damage resulting to the oc-
cupiers of land adjacent to a duly authorized 
railroad from its nonnegligent and careful op-
eration does not constitute an 'actionable nui-
sance,' irrespective of the extent of such 
annoyance or damage.'' 
''Nor does the ·causing of such damage to 
the :property owner by such nonnegligent opefla-
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tion of the railroad constitute a taking or 
appropriation of his property 'vithout due 
process of law·, or just co1npensation, in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United States." 
(B) APPELLANTS FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGE. 
The appellent Coon did not prove any damage 
by reason of the operation of respondent's trucks. The 
measure of damages is the depreciation of the market 
value of the property affected. This rule i~s announced 
in Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 137 
P. (2d) 347, 104 U. 221. 
"The measure of damages for the main-
tenance of a recurrent nuisance is the deprecia-
tion of market value of the property · affected. 
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., supra. 
The same measure of damages ~applies to 
permanent uninterrupted nuisances. See Lewis 
v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 
558, L.R.A. 1916C, 1260. It appears to be the 
view of appellant that the rule of diminution 
of market value was not pro~erly applied. It 
is claimed that witness·es for plaintiffs made 
valuations from which they computed deprecia-
tion o·n some theory of absence of the plant 
structure and without reference to other exist-
ing industries, activities and facilities. How-
ever, at least one witness indicated he· took 
into consideration .the surrounding conditions, 
and he based depreciation solely on the odors 
emanating from defendant's plant. It appears 
that the trial court based depreciation on the 
frequent recurrence of stench, not on ~any 
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assumption that the building and other physi-
cal structures of appellant as located consti- · 
tuted a nuisance. The findings and conclusions 
of the ·court indicate that in assessing damages 
the tr]al judge used the vroper criterion-the 
difference in market value of each tract with 
its improvements without the stench nuisance 
existing, as compared with_the value as affected 
by such odors.'' · 
The record contains no testimony upon which 
the court could find depreciation in market value. 
Appellant's cases support the general proposition 
that noise and vibration under certain facts and cir-
cumstances may be actionable either by injunction or 
an action for damages. 
The Utah case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 
U. 1, 262 P. 269, cited by appellants, was the case in 
which a judgment for da1nages for plaintiff resulting 
fron1 fumes and odors was reversed. The last para-
graph of the opinion contains language' which seems 
to be against the appellants in this case. 
''In applying the foregoing legal principles 
to the case at bar we must take into considera-
tion the facts as 'shown by the uncontradict~d 
evidence that the defendant's oil refinery IS 
lawful, useful, and necessary business, and is 
s_ituated in the_ industrial_ or. manuftacturing sec-
tion of the ·city; that It lS a modern well-
equipp·ed planl and. is conducted in a ~areful 
manner and- accordmg to approved methods; 
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that it is not in close proximity to the plain-
tiff's house but at a substantial distance (1,000 
feet or more) therefrom. There is no claim 
that the defendant, by any careless or extra-
ordinary or unnecessary use of its property, 
produces the injury complained of. The sole 
ground of complaint is that offensive and dis-
agreeable fumes or odors emanrate from the 
refinery and are carried through the air to 
the plaintiff's house. It is admitted that the 
odors are not constant and are not injurious 
to life or health, and it is obvious th:at they 
cause no direct or physical injury to property. 
The extent of the offense claimed is that the 
odors are disagreeable and unpleasant and have 
at times wakened persons sleeping in plain-
tiff's house ·and required them to shut doors 
and windows. In these circumstances we are 
unable to say as a matter of law that a case 
of unreasonable use or actionable nuisance was 
made out. See Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 
supra; Petroleum Refining Co. v. Common-
wealth, 192 Ky. 272, 232 S.W. 421. No p-rece-
dent for sustaining liability under similar cir-
cumstances has been cited, and we have found 
none. The essential facts with res:.pect to the 
nature, locality, and manner of use of defend-
ant's plant, and the situation with reference 
thereto of the plaintiff's house, and the degree 
and extent of the plaintiff's annoyance and 
discomfort, are so clear that the question pre-
sented is one of law. We therefore ·conclude 
that the trial court erred in not directing a 
verdict for defendant and in denying defend-
ant's motion for a new trial.'' 
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·The appellants cite another Utah case, Lewis v. 
Pingree National Bank, 47 U. 35, 151 P. 558. In thai 
case the defendant constructed a bank building so that 
it occupied a portion of the public street (Washington 
. Avenue). An injunction was denied and the_ adjoining 
prqperty owner was allowed to p·rove his damages on 
a retrial of the case. It gives no support to the con-
tentions of the appellants in the c31se at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
It is reS!pectfully submitted that the appellants 
failed to follow the method prescribed. by the Utah 
Statutes or the newly adopted rules of procedure in 
preparing the record on appeal and the transcript of 
record should be stricken and the judgment affirmed 
because the merits of the case are not properly be-
fore the court. If respond.ent is overruled in this con-
tention we submit that appellants have failed to show 
any cause of action and have failed to show any dam-
age or depreciation in the value of their ~·roperty by 
reason of respondent's operations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Resp,ondent. 
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APPENDIX ''A'' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAUD D. COON and JOSEPH COON, 
husband and wife, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
Case No. 7470 
MOTION 




Comes now the respondent, Utah Construction Com-
pany, and moves the court for an order striking the 
transcript of official proceedings and evidence, includ-
ing exhibits, on file herein, on the ground and for the 
reason that said transcript and exhibits are not legally 
and properly a part of the recond on appeal herein. 
This motion is based uv·on the files and records 
in the above named case. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
jsj A. H. Nebeker 
Attorneys for Resp_,ondent. 
Received copy of the foregoing motion this 20th 
day of September, 1950. 
jsj E. LeRoy Shields 
Attorney for Appellants. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MERIT 
A. H. Nebeker hereby certifi.eJs: That I have pre-
pared the foregoing motion to . strike the transcript of 
official record and have examined the facts and the 
law relating thereto and in my opinion the motion is 
well founded and is not interposed for delay. 
·Dated this 12th day of September, 1950. 
jsj A. H. Nebeker 
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